Seeking the Other Side of Thought-Action Fusion: Implications for Risk-Taking in Young Adulthood by Craig, Joan Cecilia
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
2014
Seeking the Other Side of Thought-Action Fusion:
Implications for Risk-Taking in Young Adulthood
Joan Cecilia Craig
University of Windsor
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd
This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters’ theses of University of Windsor students from 1954 forward. These
documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative
Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the
copyright holder (original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would require the permission of
the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please
contact the repository administrator via email (scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000ext. 3208.
Recommended Citation
Craig, Joan Cecilia, "Seeking the Other Side of Thought-Action Fusion: Implications for Risk-Taking in Young Adulthood" (2014).
Electronic Theses and Dissertations. Paper 5233.
 Seeking the Other Side of Thought – Action Fusion:  
Implications for Risk-Taking in Young Adulthood 
 
By 
Joan C. Craig 
 
A Thesis  
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies  
through the Department of Psychology 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 
the Degree of Master of Arts 
 at the University of Windsor 
 
 
 
Windsor, Ontario, Canada 
2014 
 
©  2014 Joan C. Craig 
  
 
 
 
Seeking the Other Side of Thought-Action Fusion:  
Implications for Risk-Taking in Young Adulthood 
by 
Joan C. Craig 
 
APPROVED BY: 
______________________________________________ 
R. Menna 
Department of Psychology 
 
 
______________________________________________ 
G. B. Angell 
School of Social Work 
 
______________________________________________ 
K. D. Lafreniere, Advisor 
Department of Psychology 
 
 
September 09, 2014 
iii 
 
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY 
 
 
 
I hereby certify that I am the sole author of this thesis and that no part of this thesis has 
been published or submitted for publication. 
I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, my thesis does not infringe upon anyone’s 
copyright nor violate any proprietary rights and that any ideas, techniques, quotations, or any 
other material from the work of other people included in my thesis, published or otherwise, are 
fully acknowledged in accordance with the standard referencing practices. Furthermore, to the 
extent that I have included copyrighted material that surpasses the bounds of fair dealing within 
the meaning of the Canada Copyright Act, I certify that I have obtained a written permission from 
the copyright owner(s) to include such material(s) in my thesis and have included copies of such 
copyright clearances to my appendix.  
I declare that this is a true copy of my thesis, including any final revisions, as approved 
by my thesis committee and the Graduate Studies office, and that this thesis has not been 
submitted for a higher degree to any other University or Institution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
This project identifies a cognitive bias that has not been studied as an independent 
construct in previous research. This bias is related to the thought-action fusion bias that 
has been examined in work on obsessive-compulsive disorder and various mood 
disorders. The newly identified bias, labeled positive thought-action fusion, focuses on a 
belief that one’s personal thoughts regarding positive outcomes can have an influence on 
real-life events. For example, a person may think that he will win the lottery, and he 
believes that this thought has actually improved his chance of winning. This project 
involves two studies, which together show that (1) the positive thought-action fusion bias 
does exist as an independent construct, (2) we now have a valid measure with which to 
measure it, and (3) that this bias is related to some forms of risk-taking behaviour and 
impaired mental control. Implications and future directions for research are discussed. 
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Seeking the Other Side of Thought – Action Fusion:  
Implications for Risk - Taking in Young Adulthood 
Traditional university-aged students (aged 18-25) fall within a time-frame of the 
life-span called emerging adulthood, and risk-taking behaviour is common during this 
developmental period (Todesco, 2005). Academic risk-taking behaviours, such as 
skipping classes or not studying, can result in a change in life trajectories for young 
adults in some circumstances. Gambling behaviours result in problem gambling at double 
the rate in youth aged 18-24 than in the adult population (Problem Gambling Institute of 
Ontario, 2013), and can lead to distraction from studies as well as the possible loss of 
tuition money. Sexual risk-taking behaviours can lead to unwanted pregnancies, or 
sexually transmitted infections (Norton, Fisher, Amico, Dovidio, & Johnson, 2012). 
Alcohol and drug-use can lead to unusual behaviours by the users, such as passing out or 
becoming aggressive, which can contribute to the drug or alcohol user becoming the 
perpetrator or a vulnerable victim of various crimes (Gustavson et al., 2007; Nayak, 
Lown, Bond, & Greenfield, 2012). Due to the detrimental nature of many of these risky 
behaviours, this research project seeks to increase the knowledge base of factors 
associated with risk propensity by examining a possible risk factor that has not been 
previously considered in the literature. Specifically, this project investigates a cognitive 
bias that may contribute to increased risk propensity.  
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Chapter 1 
Thought – Action Fusion 
Thought-action fusion (Rachman, 1993) is a phenomenon in which a person 
believes that his or her thoughts have direct influence on events. This construct has not 
been previously examined for its possible association to risk propensity; therefore, this 
investigation of a particular dimension of thought-action fusion will increase the breadth 
of knowledge regarding risk-taking in young adulthood.  
The concept of thought-action fusion (TAF) originated in research with people who 
experienced obsessive thoughts and displayed compulsive behaviours (Rachman, 1993). 
These people showed signs of having an exaggerated sense of responsibility, wherein 
they ascribed internal causal attributions to events from unrelated external forces. 
Rachman described how this personal responsibility was not only directed at their 
actions, or omissions of action, but also at their thoughts. These people were found to 
assign unjustified importance to random, unwanted thoughts. Furthermore, they assumed 
personal responsibility for these thoughts. For example, a person may have a random 
thought that there is a possibility that his or her friend might have a car accident, then 
assume responsibility for the thought (I must want my friend to have a car accident), and 
assign unjustified importance to that thought (Since I thought about my friend being in a 
car accident, she will probably have a car accident). Rachman (1997, 1998) developed the 
cognitive theory of obsession to explain this phenomenon. This theory describes how the 
perceived importance of normal thoughts can become inflated if one suffers from certain 
cognitive biases.   
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The original thought-action fusion (TAF) phenomenon was divided into two 
subcategories—moral and likelihood—with the second being further divided into 
likelihood-self and likelihood-other (Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996a). Moral 
TAF is the belief that having an unacceptable thought is just as bad as actually 
performing the act associated with the thought. For example, one item from the TAF 
moral subscale is “when I have a nasty thought about someone else, it is almost as bad as 
carrying out a nasty action” (Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996b). The TAF 
likelihood-self dimension assesses items that reflect a belief that having intrusive 
thoughts about oneself will increase the possibility of negative events occurring to the 
self. For example, an item from the TAF likelihood-self subscale is, “If I think of myself 
being injured in a fall, this increases the risk that I will have a fall and be injured” 
(Shafran et al., 1996b). Similarly, the likelihood-other dimension assesses items that 
reflect a belief that having intrusive thoughts about someone else will increase the 
possibility of negative events occurring to that person. An example of a TAF likelihood-
other subscale item is, “If I think of a relative/friend falling ill this increases the risk that 
he/she will fall ill” (Shafran, et al., 1996b). 
It has been suggested that thought-action fusion may be a specific form of magical 
ideation (Amir, Freshman, Ramsey, Neary & Brigidi, 2001). The term magical ideation 
refers to causal beliefs that are considered invalid by conventional standards (Eckblad 
& Chapman, 1983a). Specifically, it involves the idea that ambiguous behaviours or other 
events are the actual causal factors of unrelated occurrences. Thought-action fusion is a 
fairly specific concept, whereas, magical thinking is a broad construct that encompasses a 
wide variety of causal misconceptions, paranormal phenomena, superstitions, and 
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religious beliefs. For example, Tobacyk and Wilkinson (1990) found statistically 
significant relationships between magical thinking and beliefs in spiritualism, 
superstition, and witchcraft.  In a later study, the same authors (Tobacyk and Wilkinson, 
1991) reported a significant relationship between playing games of chance (gambling 
behaviours) and paranormal beliefs, religious beliefs and superstitions. Magical thinking 
has been investigated in populations with clinical disorders, such as its function as a 
symptom of schizotypy, or schizophrenia proneness (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983a), 
and with obsessive-compulsive disorder (Einstein & Menzies, 2004). It has also been 
investigated for its developmental role with children (Phelps and Woolley, 1994).  
Since thought-action fusion is thought to be a component of magical thinking 
(Amir et al., 2001), it is possible that TAF could be related to several other phenomena, 
such as superstition, positivity, religion, belief in good luck, and hope. In fact, some 
authors have described similarities between thought-action fusion and superstition 
(García-Montes, Pérez-Álvarez, Sass & Cangas, 2008). However, the thought-action 
fusion construct can be distinguished from superstition because of the thought-action 
causal attributions in TAF (“If I think it, the likelihood of it happening will be increased”) 
versus the action-action causal attributions in superstitions (“If I break a mirror, 
something bad will happen”). These concepts can also be differentiated on the basis of 
the personal responsibility ascribed by the person to his or her own intrusive thoughts (“I 
must want her to be in an accident”), rather than a superstitious person’s belief that there 
is possible misfortune that should be avoided, such as “I must avoid walking under 
ladders.” The personal-responsibility component ascribed to creating “causal” thoughts 
can also be used to differentiate between thought-action fusion and belief in outcomes 
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from religious prayer to a deity. However, research by Rassin and Koster (2003) found a 
statistically significant correlation between participants who identified with certain 
religions and the moral TAF subscale, and a moderate correlation between religiosity and 
the total TAF score. Marino, Lunt, and Negy (2008) performed structural equation 
modeling to investigate the possible relationship between religion and TAF. They 
concluded that the degree of religious conviction might have an influence on the 
relationship between religion and TAF because this association is mediated by a 
subjective belief of inflated responsibility, which is believed to possibly be influenced by 
unusually rigid religion-based beliefs.  
Berle and Starcevic (2005) performed a review of the TAF literature including past 
empirical studies.  They described how thought-action fusion could be an appraisal or a 
belief. For an example of TAF as an appraisal, if a person had an intrusive thought, such 
as “My father is getting older now, and may die soon,” the person might interpret it as 
“my thought has now increased the chance that my father will die soon.” However, 
thought-action fusion may also be considered a trait-like belief style, in that the person 
develops a generalized belief that thinking about things increases the probability of their 
occurrence. The authors examined the information from multiple studies, and surmised 
that it is possible that TAF exists as both appraisals and enduring beliefs. Berle and 
Starcevic also encouraged assessment of TAF across a continuum, because the ranges 
and variability of scores from the various studies they reviewed suggested that TAF is 
best conceptualized as a continuous variable.  
Past research with thought-action fusion has generally maintained a focus on 
people’s beliefs that negative events may result as a consequence of their personal 
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thoughts (e.g., Berle & Starcevic, 2005; Rachman, 1993; Shafran & Rachman, 2004). 
However, it is possible that there are two different sides to thought-action fusion—
positive and negative—and whilst Rachman and others (e.g., Muris, Meesters, Rassin, 
Merckelbach, & Campbell, 2001; O'Leary, Rucklidge, & Blampied, 2009) have 
thoroughly investigated the negative part of this construct, there is a lack of literature 
regarding beliefs that positive events will result as a consequence of personal thoughts. 
One possible reason for the gap in literature is because the thought-action fusion 
construct was developed from clinical investigations of people with obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD). Since that time, investigations involving this construct have 
remained within the boundaries of populations expressing symptoms associated with 
clinical disorders. For example, in a literature review, Berle and Starcevic found that TAF 
was prevalent in depression, eating disorders, psychotic disorders, generalized anxiety 
disorder, and other anxiety disorders in addition to its association with obsessive-
compulsive symptoms.  
O'Leary, Rucklidge, and Blampied (2009) provided a specific example of TAF 
research with their study of TAF and the inflated responsibility that is associated with it. 
They used a sample of 63 participants including adults diagnosed with OCD (n = 20), 
adults diagnosed with other anxiety disorders (n = 21), and non-clinical controls (n = 22). 
The researchers found higher levels of inflated responsibility and TAF in the clinical 
groups than in the control group. They also found that inflated responsibility was higher 
in participants with OCD compared to those with other anxiety disorders. On the other 
hand, TAF was not found to be exclusive to those with OCD, as there were no significant 
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differences in TAF between the group diagnosed with OCD and the group diagnosed 
with other anxiety disorders. 
 Muris and his colleagues (2001) looked at TAF in adolescence. The authors 
developed the Thought-Action Fusion Questionnaire for Adolescents (TAFQ-A) and 
administered it to a non-clinical sample of 427 adolescents, aged 13 – 16 years. The 
TAFQ-A was developed with questions that were designed to be meaningful for 
adolescents. Similar to the TAF Scale developed by Shafran, Thordarson, and Rachman 
(1996b), the TAFQ-A focuses on negative consequences. Each question on the TAFQ-A 
is preceded by a brief vignette to help the adolescents imagine themselves in specific 
situations. For example, one question on the TAFQ-A reads “Suddenly without any 
reason you have the thought that you are dying. Having this thought increases the risk 
that you really are going to die.” The TAFQ-A contains 15 items that are scored on a 
four-point scale that ranges from 1 = Not at all true to 4 = Very true. The authors were 
able to provide evidence for the reliability of the TAFQ-A. They also found that thought-
action fusion was related to symptoms of obsessive-compulsive disorder and a broad 
range of anxiety disorders. 
The two examples of TAF research provided above (Muris et al., 2001; O'Leary, 
Rucklidge, & Blampied, 2009) provide examples of how past thought-action fusion 
studies have focused on negative cognitive distortions in participants who report 
symptoms associated with clinical disorders. The possible existence of thought-action 
fusion with positive outcomes has been looked at before this time; however, it has never 
been investigated as a distinct phenomenon. Previous research has only ever looked at 
whether or not question items with positive consequences are related to OCD in a similar 
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fashion as negative items. For example, Shafran, Thordarson and Rachman (1996a) tested 
eight positive items during construction of the Thought-Action Fusion Scale - Revised. 
The items that were investigated focused on dimensions of positive thought-action fusion 
that suggested gains from positive thought, such as “If I think of winning the lottery, that 
will increase the chance that I win the lottery.” The researchers removed the items 
because they felt that they were not relevant to obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Amir 
and his colleagues (2001) also investigated a positive aspect of TAF. These researchers 
looked at the dimension of positive thoughts that focused on harm prevention from 
positive thoughts, such as “If I think of a relative/friend being able to avoid a car 
accident, this increases the chance that he/she will be able to avoid a car accident.” 
However, this construct was only investigated for its relationship to obsessive-
compulsive tendencies, by comparing the scores on the positive TAF items between 
participants with OCD tendencies and participants without OCD tendencies. While past 
research has kept the thought-action fusion construct within the boundaries of OCD, 
anxiety, and the clinical environment, the current project attempted to examine positive 
TAF as a distinct construct that is relevant to social phenomena, specifically, risk-taking 
behaviour. 
Study1 
Since this project seeks to investigate a construct that has not been previously 
explored, a new scale for measurement was required. A pilot study was conducted with 
198 undergraduate student participants for the development and psychometric analyses of 
a positive thought-action fusion scale. The current Thought-Action Fusion construct 
(Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996a) contains the three dimensions, labeled (1) 
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Moral, (2) Likelihood-Other, and (3) Likelihood-Self; whereas, the Positive Thought-
Action Fusion scale constructed for the pilot study included five dimensions, due to the 
existence of both positive gains and harm-avoidance, as suggested in previous literature 
(Amir et al., 2001; Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman,1996a). Items for the new Positive 
TAF Scale (P-TAF) were developed to closely resemble the items from the TAF-R scale 
created by Shafran, Thordarson, and Rachman. For example, an item from the TAF-R 
scale is “If I think of a relative/friend being in a car accident, this increases the risk that 
he/she will have a car accident,” and an item from the Positive TAF Scale is “If I think of 
a friend/relative avoiding a car accident, this decreases the chance that they will have a 
car accident.”  
Study 1 was used to establish that there actually is a positive dimension to the 
thought-action fusion phenomenon, and that it could be measured. It was used to 
investigate the thought-action fusion construct in a non-clinical environment with a 
sample of young adults. Specifically, magical ideation was studied due to its relationship 
to thought-action fusion, and its hypothesized relationship to positive thought-action 
fusion. In addition, the relationships between positive TAF and positivity, attention to 
positive information, hope, religion, and belief in good luck were investigated. These 
variables were chosen as they represent conceptually similar phenomena. Positivity, 
attention to positive information, and hope all relate to positive thinking, while religion 
and belief in good luck both represent cognitive biases, in that they are based in faith. The 
hypotheses for Study 1 were: 
H1: There is a positive dimension to the thought-action fusion phenomenon 
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H2: The positive thought-action fusion phenomenon is related to magical ideation 
H3: The positive thought-action fusion scale can demonstrate convergent and 
discriminant validity with low to moderate correlational relationships to 
conceptually similar phenomena (hope, positivity, religiosity, belief in good luck, 
and attention to positive information) 
H4: The construct validity of the positive thought-action fusion scale will be 
supported through its relationship to Shafran, Thordarson, and Rachman’s 
(1996b) Thought-Action Fusion Scale - Revised 
H5: The Positive TAF scale has 5 subscales, including Moral, Others-Gain, Self-
Gain, Others-Harm-avoidance, and Self-Harm-Avoidance 
Method 
Participants  
A sample of 198 students was obtained through the University of Windsor’s 
Psychology participant pool. There was a diverse representation of the student population 
for both age (range = 16 to 44; M = 21.51) and ethnicity (White / European = 56.1%, 
Black / African / Caribbean = 7.6%, Latin / South American = 3%, East Asian / Chinese / 
Japanese = 8.6%, South Asian / Indian / Pakistan = 12.6%, Middle Eastern = 11.6%, 
Multiracial = 1.5%, Other = 1.5%). There was an overrepresentation of female students in 
the sample (Female = 161, Male = 36, No Response = 1), which is common with samples 
drawn from the participant pool. 
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Measures   
 Thought-Action Fusion Scale – Revised (TAF). This instrument was developed 
by Shafran, Thordarson, and Rachman (1996b). The Thought-Action Fusion Scale 
Revised (TAF-R) contains 19 items that are measured on a five-point scale that ranges 
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The TAF-R has three subscales, including 
the TAF-Moral subscale, which has items such as “Thinking of making an extremely 
critical remark to a friend is almost as unacceptable to me as actually saying it.” The 
second subscale is TAF-Likelihood-Others, and these items focus on a belief that 
unwanted thoughts can result in negative consequences for others, such as “If I think of a 
relative/friend losing their job, this increases the risk that they will lose their job.” The 
third subscale is TAF-Likelihood-Self, and these items focus on a belief that unwanted 
thoughts can result in negative consequences for the person thinking those thoughts. For 
example, one item is, “If I think of myself falling ill, this increases the risk that I will fall 
ill.” 
Shafran, Thordarson, and Rachman (1996a) provided evidence for the adequate 
psychometric properties of the TAF-R Scale at the time the measure was developed. 
Since that time, the scale has gained supporting evidence from several sources (e.g., 
Pourfaraj, Mohammadi, & Taghavi, 2008; Rassin, Merckelbach, Muris, & Schmidt, 
2001; Yorulmaz, Yilmaz, & Gençöz, 2004), some of which have involved research in a 
variety of nations. 
 Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale (P – TAF). This instrument was 
developed for the current project. It contains 26 items that are measured on a seven-point 
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scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree,” rather than the five-point 
scale that was used in the TAF-R scale (please see Appendix A). The P - TAF scale was 
made with this scale differentiation in order to increase the variability of the scale, which 
attempts to address the idea that positive thought-action fusion should be best 
conceptualized on a continuum. A main difference between the Positive TAF Scale and 
the TAF – R scale is that the Positive TAF is intended to measure people’s beliefs about 
their thoughts having a direct influence on positive outcomes, rather than on the negative 
outcomes that are assessed by the TAF - R scale. Another difference between the TAF – 
R scale and the positive TAF scale is that the Positive TAF Scale conceptually has five 
subscales instead of three. The TAF-Likelihood-Others and TAF-Likelihood-Self 
subscales were further divided for the Positive TAF scale into positive-gain and harm-
avoidance categories, resulting in Moral, Others-Gain, Self-Gain, Others-Harm-
avoidance, and Self-Harm-Avoidance; however, an item-level analysis was required to 
verify this conceptualized subscale structure.  
Magical Ideation Scale (MIS). This instrument was developed by Eckblad 
and Chapman (1983b). It is a 30-item, true/false measure that has been used to study 
magical beliefs for approximately 30 years. This scale measures people’s beliefs in 
superstitions, paranormal activity, extraterrestrials, and other unconventional beliefs. The 
authors reported good coefficient alpha values (Males, α = .82; Females, α = .85). They 
also provided evidence of validity through correlational analyses of the relationships 
between the MIS and conceptually relevant scales.  
Illusory Beliefs Inventory (IBI). This instrument was recently developed by 
Kingdon, Egan, and Rees (2012). The IBI is a 24-item measure that has been developed 
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to assess magical beliefs on a five-point scale. The IBI has a three-factor structure 
including (1) magical beliefs, (2) spirituality, and (3) internal state and thought-action 
fusion. This measure was created mainly because The Magical Ideation Scale (MIS: 
Eckblad & Chapman, 1983b) was designed to measure magical thinking in a clinical 
sample, not the general population; hence, the MIS contains items that measure delusions 
and other symptoms of psychosis. Although the IBI removed the items that were 
indicative of psychosis, it created items specifically intended to assess TAF and 
superstition, because Kingdon and her colleagues considered these items to be more 
applicable in research using non-clinical samples. The IBI demonstrated acceptable 
internal reliability for the subscales (Magical Beliefs, α = .84; Spirituality, α = .87; 
Internal State, α = .75), and excellent internal consistency reliability for the overall scale 
(α = .93), as reported by Kingdon and her colleagues. This study used both the MIS and 
the IBI due to the recent development of the IBI, and the variation of factors assessed in 
both scales. 
Hope Scale. This instrument was developed by Snyder et al. (1991).  This is a 
twelve-item measure that measures hope using both agency and pathway subscales. 
‘Hope agency’ refers to an individual’s belief that he or she capable of achieving positive 
outcomes, and ‘hope pathways’ refers to the planning in order to achieve goals. These 
items are rated on a four-point scale that ranges from “definitely false” to “definitely 
true,” and includes items such as “There are lots of ways around any problem.” The 
authors documented evidence of convergent and discriminant validity, as well as 
demonstrating acceptable internal consistency and test-retest reliability.  
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Positivity Scale. This instrument (Caprara et al., 2012b) is an 8-item measure 
assessing participants’ tendency to view life and experiences with a positive outlook on a 
five-point scale that ranges from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Caprara and his 
colleagues (2012a) provided evidence of internal reliability, construct validity, and test-
retest reliability. They also provided evidence for the validity of the scale`s use in cross-
cultural studies, which suggests that the measure is applicable for diverse populations. 
Spirituality/Religiosity Scale. This instrument was developed by Good, 
Willoughby, and Busseri (2011). It is an eight-item measure that assesses religiosity and 
spirituality. Four questions use a five-point rating scale ranging from 1(never) to 5 (every 
day). One question uses a four-point scale from 1 (I never enjoy these activities) to 4 (I 
usually enjoy these activities). The remaining three items use a five-point scale from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). This measure contains items such as “In the past 
month, how often have you prayed?” 
Belief in Good Luck Scale (BIGL). This instrument was developed by Darke 
and Freedman (1997). It is a 15-item scale that measures the participants’ beliefs about 
good luck on a six-point scale, with items such as “Some people are consistently lucky, 
and others are unlucky.” Darke and Freedman reported a good internal consistency (α = 
.85), and provided evidence to support the test-retest reliability, as well as the 
discriminant validity and convergent validity of the scale.   
Attention to Positive and Negative Information Scale (APNI). This instrument 
(Noguchi, Gohm, & Dalsky, 2006b) assesses individual differences concerning the 
cognitive tendencies to focus on either positive or negative information. This measure 
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uses a five-point scale that ranges from “very untrue of me” to “very true of me,” and 
contains items such as “I easily see the fun side of any activity that I’m in.”  Noguchi, 
Gohm, and Dalsky (2006a) provided evidence for construct validity, as well as 
convergent and discriminant validity during the construction of this measure. 
Background Information.  This is a demographic measure used to collect 
information about the participants’ gender, age, ethnicity, and year of study. It was 
included mainly for the purpose of describing the sample. 
Procedure 
The pilot study was conducted online using FluidSurveys, and took approximately 
30 minutes to complete. Students were awarded 0.5 bonus point through the participant 
pool, to be used toward an eligible psychology course. The items on many of the scales 
are similar, such as those on the Magical Ideation Scale and those on the Illusory Beliefs 
Inventory. Therefore, the order of the scales was chosen to vary the subject matter of the 
items, as an attempt to reduce fatigue effects. The Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale 
was ordered first to ensure that the participants’ responses to the new scale would not be 
biased by reading any other measures before completing the new scale. The Positive 
Thought-Action Fusion Scale was followed, in order, by the Hope Scale (Snyder et al., 
1991), the Magical Ideation Scale (MIS: Eckblad & Chapman, 1983b), the Positivity 
Scale (Caprara et al., 2012), the Spirituality/Religiosity Scale (Good, Willoughby, & 
Busseri, 2011), the Illusory Beliefs Inventory (IBI; Kingdon, Egan, & Rees, 2012), the 
Belief in Good Luck Scale (BIGL; Darke & Freedman, 1997), the Thought-Action 
Fusion Scale-Revised (TAF Scale; Shafran, Thordarson & Rachman, 1996b), the 
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Attention to Positive and Negative Information Scale (APNI; Noguchi, Gohm, & Dalsky, 
2006), and the background information measure. 
Results 
Data analyses for Study 1 were focused on the psychometric evaluation of the 
Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale. As evidence for construct validity, both 
convergent and discriminant validity were investigated using correlational analyses. 
Positive TAF is a new construct, so there are no measures that are conceptually equal. 
However, if someone has the positive TAF cognitive bias, it could be expected that they 
would also endorse good luck, hope, and other similar constructs. This relationship is 
probably one-sided; wherein, those who endorse positive TAF also endorse constructs 
such as hope and luck, but those who endorse hope and luck would not necessarily 
endorse positive TAF. 
A total of 227 participants were recruited through the Psychology participant pool 
to take part in the survey. There were 29 incomplete entries, resulting in 198 cases for use 
in the study. The entire survey, including all measures, contained 156 items. There were 
46 cases that were missing data for one item, two cases that were missing data for three 
items, one case that was missing data for four items, and one case that was missing data 
for six items. Analyses of the missing data patterns suggested that all these data were 
missing at random; therefore, a multiple imputation method was used to fill in the 
missing data prior to analyses. 
Normality was examined with the use of histograms, as well as skew and kurtosis 
values. All histograms approached normal distributions, and the skew and kurtosis values 
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fell within the acceptable ranges (skew between -2 and 2, kurtosis between -3 and 3). 
Linearity and outliers were assessed by visual inspection of bivariate scatterplots. All of 
the scatterplots displayed linear relationships. There was no indication of any outliers that 
were influencing the relationships between any of the variables. Please see Appendix B 
for descriptive information of all scales for Study 1. 
The internal reliability of all scales and subscales were tested using Cronbach’s 
alpha. Most of the internal consistencies fell in the acceptable (.6 ≤ α < .7), good (.7 ≤ α < 
.9), or excellent (α ≥ .9) ranges. There were two scales that were in the poor (.5 ≤ α < .6) 
range: The Hope Scale (α = .55) and the Positivity Scale (α = .59). Please see Table 1 for 
all reliability values. 
In assessing discriminant validity, a correlational analysis between the P - TAF 
Scale and the Hope Scale (Snyder et al., 1991) resulted in a weak correlation that was not 
significant, r(198) = .12, p = .094. Similarly, there was not a significant correlation 
between the Positivity Scale (Caprara et al., 2012) and the P - TAF Scale, r(198) = .03,   
p = .725. Attention to positive information (as measured by the positive subscale of the 
Attention to Positive and Negative Information Scale; Noguchi, Gohm, & Dalsky, 2006) 
was also not significantly related to the P - TAF Scale, r(198) = .12, p = .104. These 
results provide evidence for discriminant validity, as the P-TAF Scale is intended to 
measure a cognitive bias, rather than positive thinking. 
 The Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale was moderately positively correlated 
with the Belief in Good Luck Scale, r(198) = .42, p < .001, the Magical Ideation Scale, 
r(198) = .51, p < .001, the Illusory Beliefs Inventory, r(198) = .53, p < .001, the TAF-R, 
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r(198) = .57, p < .000, and the Spirituality / Religiosity Scale, r(198) = .36, p < .001. 
These relationships provide support for convergent validity for the P - TAF Scale, as 
these scales all assess various cognitive biases. Please see Appendix C for a listing of all 
correlations, including correlations between the measurement subscales. 
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Table 1 Scale and Subscale Reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) for all measures 
Scale 
Number 
of Scale 
Items 
Alpha 
   
Thought-Action Fusion Scale – Revised (TAF-R) 19 .94 
     TAF-R Moral 12 .94 
     TAF-R Likelihood Others 4 .95 
     TAF-R Likelihood Self 3 .81 
Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale (P-TAF) 26 .95 
     P-TAF Moral 3 .71 
     P-TAF Likelihood Others Gain 5 .91 
     P-TAF Others Harm-Avoidance 5 .86 
     P-TAF Likelihood Self Gain 8 .87 
     P-TAF Self Harm-Avoidance  5 .78 
Magical Ideation Scale (MIS) 30 .88 
Illusory Beliefs Inventory (IBI) 24 .88 
     IBI Magical Beliefs 10 .79 
     IBI Spirituality 9 .80 
     IBI Internal State/Thought-Action Fusion 5 .79 
Hope Scale 12 .55 
     Hope Agency 4 .80 
     Hope Pathways 4 .67 
Positivity Scale 8 .59 
Spirituality / Religiosity Scale 8 .86 
Belief in Good Luck Scale (BIGL) 15 .85 
Attention to Positive and Negative Information Scale (APNI) 22 .85 
     APNI positive 11 .92 
     APNI negative 11 .88 
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Study 1 Discussion 
The Positive TAF Scale contains 26 items on a seven-point scale. Therefore, the 
participants’ total scores had possible values ranging from a minimum of 26 to a 
maximum of 182. The participants in this study reported values that ranged from 26 to 
161, with 14.4% of the participants scoring over 100. This supports Hypothesis 1, which 
stated, “There is a positive dimension to the thought-action fusion phenomenon.” 
Hypothesis 2 purported that the positive thought-action fusion phenomenon is 
related to magical ideation. This hypothesis was supported with moderate correlations 
between positive TAF and magical beliefs, as measured by the Magical Ideation Scale 
and the Illusory Beliefs Scale. 
Hypothesis 3 stated that the positive thought-action fusion scale can demonstrate 
convergent and discriminant validity with low to moderate correlational relationships to 
conceptually similar phenomena. Positive TAF was not significantly related to hope, 
positivity or attention to positive information. This supports the discriminant validity of 
the Positive TAF construct, as this measure was designed to assess a cognitive bias 
instead of assessing positive thinking. The absence of high correlations provides evidence 
that positive TAF is not the same as optimism or positive thinking, but rather it is a 
distinct construct. 
Support for convergent validity was gained through the moderate correlations 
between positive TAF and spirituality, and between positive TAF and belief in good luck. 
Both spirituality (faith) and belief in good luck are forms of cognitive biases. These 
moderate correlations show that the Positive TAF Scale is measuring a construct that is 
 21 
 
conceptually similar to these other constructs, which is consistent with theory. At the 
same time, the absence of extremely high correlations shows that positive TAF is distinct 
from these other constructs. Please see Appendix C for the relationships between positive 
TAF and conceptually similar constructs. 
The construct validity of the positive thought-action fusion scale was supported 
through its relationship to Shafran, Thordarson, and Rachman’s (1996b) Thought-Action 
Fusion Scale, which provides support for Hypothesis 4.  
The subscale structure of the Positive TAF scale (Moral, Others-Gain, Self-Gain, 
Others-Harm-avoidance, and Self-Harm-Avoidance) was examined using the internal 
reliability of each subscale. The Cronbach’s alpha values provided support for 
Hypothesis 5 with evidence for the five-subscale structure, including P-TAF Moral, P-
TAF Likelihood-Others Gain, P-TAF Others Harm-Avoidance, P-TAF Likelihood-Self 
Gain, and P-TAF Self Harm-Avoidance. 
Overall, Study 1 was successful in providing support for the validity and internal 
reliability of the Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale. The results indicated that the P-
TAF Scale is suitable for use in Study 2, which looks at the relationship of the positive 
TAF cognitive bias to various forms of risky behaviour and risk perception. One of the 
limitations for Study 1 is the inability to perform an exploratory factor analysis due to an 
insufficient sample size. Another limitation is that the positive TAF construct was not 
tested for its association to obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Both of these limitations 
were addressed in Study 2. 
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Chapter 2  
Risk Taking in Young Adulthood 
 The focus of Study 2 is on the relationship of positive thought-action fusion to 
risky behaviour. There are several forms of risk that are prevalent among young adults. 
These forms of risk include academic risk-taking, gambling behaviours, risky sexual 
behaviours, and alcohol and drug use. Academic risk-taking can involve a wide variety of 
behaviours, including skipping class and failing to do assignments. Other academic 
behaviours, such as procrastination, have also been found to be a form of risk-taking 
(Keinan & Bereby-Meyer, 2012; Schouwenburg, 1992). Procrastination and other risky 
academic behaviours can affect students’ grades and academic standing. Gambling 
behaviours are pure risk by definition, and thus, provide an exemplar for studying risk 
propensity. Additionally, gambling behaviours have been implicated as an impediment to 
academic success (Dickson & Derevensky, 2006).  
 Most people engage in risky behaviours on a daily basis. For example, in 2010, 
170,629 Canadians were injured in vehicle collisions (Transportation Canada, 2014), yet 
most people still choose to drive their car every day. Furthermore, there are also many 
risks that are beneficial to the person taking the risk and to society as a whole. If no one 
engaged in risk-taking behaviour, progress would be non-existent—new drugs could not 
be developed without human drug trials, and new inventions would not be realized if no 
one took a risk to invest in their development. Risk is also discussed in the context of 
situations that people find themselves in, such as the risk associated with growing up in 
poverty. Extensive research has focused on risky contexts and people who display 
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resilience to these risks (Fraser, Galinsky & Richman, 1999).  However, the current study 
only focuses on four distinct forms of risk-taking behaviour: Gambling, Drug / alcohol 
use, risky sexual behaviour, and academic risk. These forms were chosen for this study as 
they represent some of the more common forms of risky behaviour among older 
adolescents and young adults. In addition, these forms of risk-taking behaviour represent 
some of the variability that is found in various forms of risk taking.  
Not all forms of risk are the same. For example, if you want to participate in a 
gambling activity, the risk is inherent and unavoidable. The consumption of alcohol and 
drugs has a certain amount of inherent risk, but many of these risks can be minimized by 
actions such as avoiding binge drinking or avoiding drinking around strangers. Similarly, 
engaging in sexual activity carries a certain amount of risk, but these risks can also be 
minimized with such things as contraceptive use and avoidance of dangerous situations. 
Academic activities do not carry any inherent risks, and are only risky if the student 
chooses to engage in risky behaviour. Therefore, a person can still engage in academic 
activities even if they are risk averse. Alcohol, drug consumption, and sexual activity can 
still be engaged in by a risk-averse individual, provided they take measures to reduce the 
risk. However, a person is unable to participate in gambling without unavoidable risk. 
The current study employs these four types of risk-taking behaviour in an attempt to 
sample some of the diversity found in risk-taking behaviours. 
Gambling  
Due to its entertainment value, gambling is generally considered a socially 
acceptable behaviour. Gambling operations such as bingo halls and casinos employ a 
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large number of personnel and generate revenue. Additionally, schools, community 
groups, and sports groups hold raffles and various gambling events as fundraising 
initiatives. The negative effects of excessive youth gambling, such as personal, social, 
legal and educational consequences remain largely unnoticed by the general public. 
Although most youth gamble in a controlled manner, many do experience serious 
problems (Dickson & Derevensky, 2006).  
Gupta and Derevensky (1998) examined gambling behaviour and cognitive 
perceptions of gambling activities in a study with 817 secondary school students from the 
Montreal Region in Quebec. Over 80% of the students reported gambling in the past year. 
Furthermore, they reported gambling more often than they reported participating in other 
risky behaviours, such as alcohol and drug use. Pathological gamblers (4.7% of the 
students, as measured by the DSM-IV-J; Fisher, 1992) were more likely to be engaging in 
illegal activities than non-pathological gamblers. They were also more likely to have 
parents with gambling problems. 
Barrault and Varescon (2012) researched cognitive distortions in gamblers using 
assessments by others and self-report scales. The authors found that people with irrational 
beliefs tended to overestimate their control over the outcome of gambling events, and that 
having good numeric reasoning did not prevent gamblers from developing false beliefs. 
They also found that cognitive distortions were more prevalent in pathological gamblers, 
leading them to increase their frequency, and the intensity (financial risk taking) of their 
gambling. 
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In a review of the literature, Toneatto and Ladoceur (2003) found that there are 
very few programs for problem gambling that have been empirically supported; though, 
they did find substantial support suggesting that problem gamblers are not a homogenous 
group. Toneatto and Ladoceur found that gambling entails a complex interaction between 
several components (ecological, psycho-physiological, developmental, cognitive, and 
behavioural). The authors evaluated 11 programs and found that programs that employed 
cognitive–behavioural methods received the most empirical support. It is possible that 
these cognitive-behavioural programs may benefit from the current study, as it seeks to 
provide information that will increase the knowledge base about cognitive biases that 
may influence risk-taking behaviour. 
Drug and Alcohol Use  
A study by Killen, Leviton, and Cahill (1991) examined adolescents’ conceptions 
of drug use in research with 60 students in Grades 10 to12. Results indicated that the 
participants evaluated drug use as either a moral or personal issue. They rarely evaluated 
drug use as a social-conventional issue. The students consistently categorized legal and 
illegal drugs differently, but they acknowledged that all drugs can cause harm. This 
suggests that youth are aware of the risk associated with drug use, but they feel that the 
decision of whether or not to use drugs is a personal or moral issue.  
Peterson, Baer, Wells, Ginzler, and Garrett (2006) performed a randomized trial 
with high-risk youth to evaluate a drug intervention program. Homeless adolescents (N = 
285) were assigned to one of three groups, which included two different control groups 
and a brief motivational enhancement (ME) group. The ME group was presented with 
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personal feedback about patterns of risk related to alcohol or drug use. Follow-up 
interviews (1 month and 3 months after the intervention) revealed that the youths in the 
ME group did not report any treatment effects for alcohol or marijuana use, but they did 
report less illicit drug use for drugs other than marijuana at the one month follow-up. 
Unfortunately, this reduction in drug use was not supported at the three-month follow-up, 
suggesting that any benefits from this program are temporary. The current study aimed to 
increase the knowledge base of cognitive distortions that are associated with risky 
behaviours, such as drug use. In doing so, it is possible that the knowledge gained from 
this study may be used to strengthen current intervention programs, such as the ME 
intervention program described above. 
Past research has investigated cognitive distortions in relation to drug use. For 
example, Dalton (2006) used archival records from a drug treatment facility for criminal 
offenders to investigate the frequency of substance use in relation to cognitive distortions. 
The author examined five classes of drugs (ecstasy, alcohol, opiates, hallucinogens, and 
amphetamines) and four categories of cognitive distortions (self-centered, blaming 
others, minimizing/mislabeling, and assuming the worst).  Dalton found a main effect for 
patterns of cognitive distortions on ecstasy use, but there were no significant findings for 
any of the other substances. By expanding the breadth of cognitive distortions, the current 
project may be able to identify a cognitive distortion that relates to other drug use and 
other risky behaviours.  
Fromme, Katz, and D'Amico (1997) investigated the effects of intoxication on 
young adults’ perceptions of negative consequence. Participants (N = 107) were 
randomly assigned to either an alcohol consumption group or a control group. Using the 
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Cognitive Appraisal of Risky Events Scale (CARE: Fromme, Katz, & Rivet, 1997), the 
participants provided ratings of the likelihood that positive or negative consequences 
would result from a variety of risky activities. The results indicated that participants 
perceived significantly fewer negative consequences for drug use, aggressive / illegal 
activities, or risky sexual behaviour if they were intoxicated. The findings from this study 
suggest that risk perception is rather fluid, and may become distorted on a temporary 
basis under certain conditions. It is therefore possible that risk perceptions may become 
distorted if someone is suffering from a cognitive distortion that is a temporary appraisal 
rather than a trait-like belief, and as mentioned previously, thought-action fusion is 
thought to exist as both appraisals and trait-like beliefs (Berle and Starcevic, 2005). 
Risky Sexual Behaviour  
In a study of risky sexual behaviour (Norton, Fisher, Amico, Dovidio, & Johnson, 
2012), college students (N = 198) were randomized into one of four groups, three of 
which each received an intervention that focused on a specific negative consequence 
from risky sexual activity. The four groups were (1) control group, (2) pregnancy, (3) 
STIs, and (4) HIV, and they received an identical intervention program, except that the 
emphasis was placed on a different negative consequence for each group. The 
experimenters found that participants who were exposed to the pregnancy or STI 
intervention programs reported less risky sexual behaviour and greater condom use at 
follow-up than those in the HIV group. The authors concluded that participants may have 
different behaviour-change outcomes, depending on the focus of the sexual risk 
intervention programs they attend. This finding highlights the variability of risk 
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perception, and the importance of assessing individual perception when researching risk-
taking behaviour. 
Academic Risk  
Bridges and Roig (1997) investigated the relationship between irrational thinking 
and academic procrastination.  The authors found that procrastination correlated with a 
general measure of irrational beliefs, as well as with a subscale of problem avoidance. 
Since there is a relationship between thought-action fusion and illusory beliefs (Amir et 
al., 2001), and the study by Bridges and Roig found a relationship between irrational 
beliefs and procrastination, it follows that there may be a relationship between positive 
thought-action fusion and procrastination, which is a form of academic risk. 
General Risk  
Todesco (2005) examined developmental differences in general risk-taking 
behaviours. He also investigated developmental differences in sensation seeking and 
perceptual appraisals of risk. The study had 236 participants, who were college students 
at a Midwestern University. There were significant differences found between adults 
aged 18-25 years, and those aged 26-34 years. The young adults aged 18-25 years were 
found to engage in sensation seeking and risky behaviours significantly more than those 
26-34 years old. Additionally, the 18-25 year olds perceived risky events as less harmful 
than the 26-34 year olds. However, Todesco found no significant differences in the 
participants’ level of unrealistic optimism in relation to their age group (18-25 years or 
26-34 years), level of risk taking (high – low), or their sensation seeking (high-low).  
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Anderson and Galinski (2006) investigated the role of perceived personal power in 
optimism and risk-taking. They found that optimistic risk perceptions acted as a mediator 
by increasing the effects of perceived personal power on risk-taking. This is relevant to 
the current project, since the positive TAF construct refers to belief in positive outcomes 
from positive thoughts, thus suggesting a form of personal power and an optimistic bias 
about risk. Additionally, Anderson and Galinski found that a sense of responsibility for 
others’ outcomes moderated the participants’ risk proclivity. Consequently, the personal 
responsibility associated with TAF would probably influence the relationship between 
positive TAF likelihood-others and risk through harm avoidance. These would reflect the 
items from the Positive TAF harm avoidance subscales (e.g., “If I think of a 
friend/relative avoiding a car accident, this decreases the chance that they will have a car 
accident”). This emphasizes the need to assess both gain and harm-reduction dimensions 
of the likelihood-self and likelihood-other subscales for positive TAF when examining it 
in relation to risky behaviours. 
The Current Study  
The current project contributes information to the literature about a phenomenon 
that has never been studied as a distinct cognitive bias. Positive thought-action fusion 
may help explain the pervasiveness of some risk-taking behaviour, such as that witnessed 
with pathological gambling. In addition to the hypothesized relationship between positive 
thought-action fusion and risk-taking behaviour, some additional analyses were also 
included in Study 2, including further analysis of the positive TAF construct and the 
Positive TAF Scale. Age and gender relationships were also examined to help guide 
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future studies. There are several research questions being addressed in this study. These 
questions are: 
1) Is positive thought-action fusion associated with risk-taking in young 
adulthood, and if so, how is it related?  
2) Are the harm-avoidance subscales from the Positive TAF scale related to 
cognitive distortions previously associated with obsessive-compulsive disorder?  
3) Is positive thought-action fusion related to perceptions of risk and risky 
behaviour? 
4) Does positive thought-action fusion explain variance in risk-taking behaviour 
above that explained by conceptually similar variables, such as belief in good 
luck?  
Hypotheses 
H1: Higher scores on the Positive TAF scale will be associated with more past and 
expected future involvement in academic risk-taking behaviours. 
H2: Higher scores on the Positive TAF scale will be associated with more past and 
expected future involvement in gambling behaviour. 
H3: Higher scores on the Positive TAF scale will be associated with more past and 
expected future involvement in risky sexual behaviour. 
H4: Higher scores on the Positive TAF scale will be associated with more past and 
expected future involvement in alcohol and drug use. 
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H5: The positive gain subscales (self and other) of the Positive TAF scale will 
share the strongest relationship with past and expected future involvement in risky 
behaviour.  
H6: The harm-avoidance subscales (self and other) will be associated with impaired 
control over mental activities similar to the impaired control found with obsessive-
compulsive disorder.  
H7: Positive TAF will be inversely related to the participants’ perception of 
possible negative risk. 
H8: Positive TAF will be positively related to the participants’ perception of 
possible positive consequences.  
H9: Positive TAF will contribute to risk-taking behaviour above the participants’ 
belief in good luck, magical thinking, and spirituality. 
Method 
Participants 
A sample of 273 students between the ages of 16 and 25 was obtained through the 
Psychology participant pool (n = 261) and through a snowball recruitment procedure (n = 
12). The use of a student sample is considered appropriate for the current research despite 
concerns that have been raised about student research populations (e.g., Henry, 2008), 
since cheating and other violations of academic integrity are best assessed in a population 
from an academic setting. Furthermore, since youth and young adults are overrepresented 
among those with risky behaviours (Todesco, 2005), they were the target age group for 
 32 
 
the current research project, and the predominant age range of the students in the 
participant pool is representative of youth and young adults.  
Exclusionary criteria for participant recruitment included age, as a sample 
between the ages of 16 and 25 was preferred for this study. Participants must also have 
been enrolled in a post-secondary institution in the Windsor-Essex County region to be 
eligible for this study. These criteria for inclusion were meant to avoid the recruitment of 
subsamples that are too small for analyses. 
In addition to the advertisement through the Psychology participant pool, 
recruitment included poster distribution around campus, as well as snowball recruitment. 
Those recruited from the participant pool received 0.5 bonus points towards an eligible 
Psychology course, and those recruited outside of the participant pool were compensated 
with an opportunity to be entered into a draw for a one hundred dollar MasterCard
©
 gift 
card. The snowball recruitment was an attempt to increase the number of male 
participants, since risk is more prevalent among males than females (Byrnes, Miller, & 
Schafer, 1999), and the Psychology participant pool generally has a low proportion of 
male volunteers. 
Despite the efforts to increase male participation, the majority of participants in 
Study 2 were female (females = 83.3%; males = 16.3%). There was a fairly diverse 
ethnic representation of the student population (White / European = 72%, Black / African 
/ Caribbean = 3%, Latin / South American = 1.5%, East Asian / Chinese / Japanese = 
4.5%, South Asian / Indian / Pakistan = 4.9%, Aboriginal / Métis / Fist Nations = 1.1%, 
Middle Eastern = 7.2%, Multiracial = 2.7%, Other = 2.7%). 
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Measures 
Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale (P -TAF). This is a 26-item measure that 
was developed for the current project. The validity of this measure was tested during 
Study 1, which indicated internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) values that ranged from 
acceptable to excellent (α = .71 to .91). This scale is used to assess the positive dimension 
of the thought-action fusion phenomenon on a seven-point scale that ranges from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” The P - TAF currently consists of five subscales: 
Moral TAF, Likelihood-Others-Positive-Gain TAF, Likelihood-Self-Positive-Gain TAF, 
Likelihood-Others-Harm-Avoidance TAF, and Likelihood-Self-Harm-Avoidance TAF 
(Please see Appendix A). 
Gambling Behaviour Survey. This survey contains questions to assess the 
frequency of participants’ past gambling behaviours and expected future gambling 
behaviours. Some of the items for this survey were taken from the Canadian Adolescent 
Gambling Inventory (CAGI; Trembay, Weibe, Stinchfield, & Wynne, 2010), with 
adjustments made to reflect gambling behaviours found in young adult populations. The 
authors of the CAGI reported good internal consistency, as measured by Cronbach’s 
alpha (α = .83 to α = .90). The gambling behaviours of interest for this study include 
scratch tickets, lottery tickets, casino games, and internet gambling (Please see 
Appendices M and N). 
Cognitive Appraisal of Risky Events. Fromme, Katz, and Rivet (1997) developed 
the Cognitive Appraisal of Risky Events Scale (CARE) to measure both perceived risk 
and the participants’ expected involvement in risk behaviours. The authors were able to 
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demonstrate content, construct, and criterion validity. The measure uses a seven-point 
scale that ranges from “not at all likely” to “extremely likely.” Fromme and her 
colleagues based the development of this scale on the idea that a risky activity is 
something that could result in either a positive or negative consequence. For example, 
missing class may have the expected benefit of having more time to work on 
assignments, which could result in a higher grade. However, skipping class may also 
have the expected risk of missing information that is required for the exam, which could 
result in a lower grade. Fromme and her colleagues found that the expectation of possible 
positive consequences was positively and reliably associated with the participants’ 
involvement in risky activities. For this reason, the CARE measurement includes three 
scales, which are (1) Expected Risk, (2) Expected Benefit, and (3) Expected Involvement. 
Each of these three scales is subdivided into risk domains, resulting in six Expected Risk 
subscales, six Expected Benefit subscales, and six Expected Involvement subscales. In 
the current study, only the subscales that assess risk perception and behaviour in the 
domains of drug use, alcohol use, risky sexual behaviour, and risky academic behaviours 
were of interest, so the subscales assessing aggressive / illegal behaviours and high-risk 
sports were removed prior to testing. 
To gain an accurate measure of the participants’ risky behaviour, an additional 
scale was added to measure past involvement. This scale used the same items from the 
Expected Risk, Expected Benefit, and Expected Involvement scales for the of drug use, 
alcohol use, risky sexual behaviour, and risky academic behaviour subscales. The only 
changes were that the prompt read “How often have you engaged in this activity in the 
past year?” and it was scored on a 7-point scale that included Never, Once, Twice, Three 
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times, Four times, Five times, and Six or more times. Please see Appendices O, P, Q, and 
R for all CARE measures. 
Padua Inventory. Sanavio (1988a) developed the 60-item Padua inventory as an 
assessment of obsessive-compulsive disorder. The measure has four factors that assess 
various obsessive-compulsive thought patterns and tendencies; however, the current 
study only employed Factor 1(impaired control over mental activities), since this factor 
has been associated with magical ideation and thought-action fusion in previous literature 
(Einstein & Menzies, 2004). Factor 1 contains 17 items, such as “Unpleasant thoughts 
come into my mind against my will and I cannot get rid of them.” Only the items from 
Factor 1were measured for this project, as the remaining 43 items are not required for the 
current study, and would have produced unnecessary fatigue effects for the participants. 
Illusory Beliefs Inventory (IBI). (Kingdon, Egan, & Rees, 2012). The IBI is a 
24-item measure that assesses magical beliefs on a five-point scale ranging from 
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. The IBI has a three-factor structure including (1) 
magical beliefs, (2) spirituality, and (3) internal state and thought-action fusion. Kingdon 
and her colleagues reported that the IBI demonstrated excellent internal consistency 
reliability for the overall scale (α = .93), and acceptable internal reliability for the 
subscales (Magical Beliefs, α = .84; Spirituality, α = .87; Internal State, α = .75). 
Examples of items include “I avoid unlucky numbers” from the Magical Beliefs subscale, 
“There is an invisible force guiding us all” from the Spirituality subscale, and 
“Sometimes I get a feeling that something is going to happen, before it happens” from the 
Internal State subscale. 
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Spirituality/Religiosity Scale. This instrument was developed by Good, 
Willoughby, and Busseri (2011). It is an eight-item measure that assesses religiosity and 
spirituality. Four questions use a five-point rating scale ranging from 1(never) to 5 (every 
day), and three items use a five-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly 
agree). One question uses a four-point scale from 1 (I never enjoy these activities) to 4 (I 
usually enjoy these activities). To facilitate analysis, this item was scored on a five-point 
scale in the current study by the addition of 5(I always enjoy these activities). The 
Spirituality / Religiosity Scale contains such items as “In the past month, how often have 
you prayed?” 
Belief in Good Luck Scale (BIGL). This instrument was developed by Darke 
and Freedman (1997). It is a 15-item scale that measures the participants’ beliefs about 
good luck on a six-point scale, with items such as “Some people are consistently lucky, 
and others are unlucky,” and “I tend to win at games of chance.” The authors reported a 
good internal consistency (α = .85), and provided evidence of convergent validity, 
discriminant validity, and test-retest reliability. 
Demographic Questionnaire.  This demographic measure is for the purpose of 
collecting information about the participants’ gender, age, SES, ethnicity, major, and year 
of study. It was included for gender and age analyses, and for the purpose of describing 
the sample. 
Procedure 
The study was administered online through FluidSurveys. It took approximately 
20 - 25 minutes to complete the survey. The questions within each individual measure 
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were presented in a randomized order. The participants completed the Positive TAF 
Scale, followed by the Gambling Behaviour Survey (with items from CAGI; Trembay, 
Weibe, Stinchfield, & Wynne, 2010), the Cognitive Appraisal of Risky Events Scale 
(Fromme, Katz, & Rivet, 1997), the Padua Inventory (Factor 1; Sanavio, 1988a), the 
Illusory Beliefs Inventory (Kingdon, Egan, & Rees, 2012), The Spirituality / Religiosity 
Scale (Good, Willoughby, & Busseri, 2011), the Belief in Good Luck Scale (Darke & 
Freedman, 1997), and the Demographic Questionnaire.   
Results 
Data Analysis 
Complete or partially complete data were obtained from participants using the 
Psychology participant pool (n = 261), and a snowball recruitment method (n = 12), for a 
total of 273 participants. One case was missing too much data to be useful for any 
analyses, so it was removed. Some of the remaining cases (n = 11) had only completed 
the first few scales; however, since the Positive TAF Scale was the first scale presented, 
their data were complete for that scale, and were therefore retained for use in the 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA). Some other cases (n = 25) were missing one random 
item on the Positive TAF Scale. Where there was any data missing at random, a multiple 
imputation method was used to fill in the missing data. No significant differences were 
found between the participants drawn from the Psychology participant pool and those 
obtained using the snowball method for the individual items from the Positive TAF Scale. 
Therefore, the participants were pooled for use in the EFA, resulting in a sample of 272 
participants.  
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The data were then examined for use in the remaining analyses. There were eight 
additional cases that were removed because they were missing information for at least 
25% of the items. This resulted in 264 cases available for analyses.  
The Belief in Good Luck Scale (BIGL) had two items that required reverse 
coding (items 9 and 15), and the Illusory Beliefs Inventory (IBI) had seven items that 
were reverse scored (items 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 17, and 19). Scale scores were calculated for 
all measures, and subscale scores were calculated for the CARE Scale and the IBI.  
In addition, the CARE Alcohol Use and Drug Use subscales were combined into 
one scale (Drinking and Drug use) by summing each of the two corresponding subscale 
values. For example, expected future involvement for alcohol use was added to the 
expected future involvement for drug use to result in the subscale labeled, Expected 
Future Involvement Drinking and Drug Use. Subsequently, the Expected Future 
Involvement subscales were combined with the Past Involvement subscales for all risk 
behaviours (Gambling, Drinking and Drugs, Sexual, and Academic) to create total 
behaviour subscales. 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 The assumptions for factor analysis are an adequate sample size, absence of 
influential data points, normality, and absence of multicollinearity or singularity. 
Normality was assessed using a combination of histograms and Q – Q plots, as well as 
skew and kurtosis values. The histograms and Q – Q plots suggested that the data 
approached normal, and the skew and kurtosis values were all within the acceptable range 
(skew between -2 and 2; kurtosis between -3 and 3). To assess for influential data points, 
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standardized z-scores were saved into the data file. Twelve of the z-scores (range = 3.39 
to 4.18) exceeded Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2007) suggested cut-off z-score of 3.29, so 
these twelve cases were removed. The remaining sample size for Study 2 (N = 260) met 
the estimated requirement of ten cases per variable. Multicollinearity and singularity were 
assessed using bivariate correlations, which showed significant correlations between most 
items (please see Appendix D). The highest of the correlations (r = .77) was not high 
enough to suggest singularity, but there was enough correlation between items (range r = 
.09 to r = .77) to enable factor analysis.  
Velicer’s Minimum Average Partial (MAP) test suggested the retention of three 
factors. Examination of the SCREE plot suggested the retention of five factors. The 
Kaiser Guttman rule (eigenvalue >1) suggested the retention of four factors. The 
cumulative percentage of variance accounted for increased from three factors (56.04%) to 
four factors (60.70%) and five factors (64.08%), and then slowed, only reaching the 
desired 80% at eleven factors. The decision was made to analyze the data for five factors 
as suggested by the SCREE plot, since these factors allowed for a fair amount of variance 
accounted for, while still maintaining parsimony.  
The exploratory factor analysis was performed using principal axis as the method 
for factor extraction. A promax rotation was then used to account for the correlation 
between items, while maximizing the interpretability of the factors. There were no cross-
loaded items present (please see Appendix E). The five factors that were produced were 
different from those that had been hypothesized, but the new subscales did appear 
conceptually relevant (please see Appendix F). Cronbach’s alpha was used to assess the 
internal reliability of the five factors, which resulted in Factor 1, Others (α = .91); Factor 
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2, Self (α = .84); Factor 3, Financial Gain (α = .86); Factor 4, Moral (α = .75); and Factor 
5, Ethical / Global Concern (α = .76). The internal reliability of the total scale was also 
assessed using Cronbach’s alpha (α = .94). Item-level analyses indicated that the 
reliability of either the total scale or the individual subscales would not be appreciably 
increased by the removal of any specific items.  
Independent Samples T-Tests 
 Gender and age differences were assessed using independent samples t tests. Age 
was divided into categorical variables for the analyses, with the groups being defined as 
older adolescents (16 – 19 years) and young adults (20 – 24 years). There was no 
significant difference in the degree of positive thought-action fusion between adolescents 
(n = 79, M = 66.96, SD = 23.50) and young adults (n = 181, M = 69.83, SD = 27.76); 
t(258) = -.801, p = .424. There was also no significant difference in the degree of positive 
thought-action fusion between males (n = 43, M = 71.58, SD = 30.19) and females (n = 
220, M = 68.50, SD = 25.56); t(261) = .702, p = .483. 
 A statistically significant difference was found in risk-taking behaviour between 
adolescents (n = 79, M = 114.61, SD = 35.82) and young adults (n = 181, M = 127.17, SD 
= 46.92); t(191.923) = -2.356, p = .019. There was also a significant difference in risk-
taking behaviour between males (n = 43, M = 147.58, SD = 62.61) and females (n = 220, 
M = 118.53, SD = 37.85); t(48.167) = 2.939, p = .005, with young adults and males 
reporting higher levels of risk-taking behaviour.  
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Correlational Analyses 
Positive TAF and risk-taking behaviour. The assumption of linearity was 
assessed by examination of bivariate scatterplots, which all suggested linear relationships 
between the various forms of risk and the Positive TAF scale and subscales. Two 
participants were removed, as they were identified as influential outliers. The assumption 
of approximated normal distributions was supported by both normality plots and skew 
and kurtosis values for all variables except the sexual behaviour subscale. The sexual 
behaviour subscale was transformed, which corrected the normality violation (skew = 
1.64, kurtosis = 1.82). Please see Table 2 for descriptive statistics and Table 3 for 
correlational results.  
The results from the correlational analyses indicate that there is a statistically 
significant positive relationship between positive thought-action fusion and gambling, as 
well as between positive thought-action fusion and sexual risk-taking behaviour. These 
results provide support for Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3. However, Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 4 were not supported in this study, as there were no significant relationships 
between positive TAF and academic risk or alcohol / drug use. 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 
 N M SD Cronbach’s     
α 
 
P-TAF Total Scale 
 
262 
 
68.50 
 
25.84 .94 
P-TAF Other Subscale 262 22.34 11.07 .91 
P-TAF Self Subscale 262 22.58 8.25 .84 
P-TAF Financial Gain Subscale 262 8.07 4.93 .86 
P-TAF Moral Subscale 262 7.76 3.88 .75 
P-TAF Ethical/Global Concern Subscale 262 7.76 4.19 .76 
Gambling Behaviour 262 42.98 18.83 .89 
Academic Risk 262 30.22 13.11 .89 
Sexual Risk 262 16.53 8.27 .75 
Drinking and Drug Behaviour 262 33.00 19.02 .92 
Total Risk Behaviour 262 122.73 42.70 .92 
Perceived Academic Consequences 263 26.39 6.84 .88 
Perceived Sexual Consequences 263 35.11 8.06 .90 
Perceived Alcohol / Drug Consequences 263 29.69 8.98 .88 
Perceived Academic Benefits 263 8.01 3.95 .81 
Perceived Sexual Benefits 263 9.66 5.62 .86 
Perceived Alcohol / Drug Benefits     263 13.52     7.91 .89 
Padua Factor 1 261 36.55 12.30 .91 
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Table 3 Correlations between P-TAF and Risk Variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. P-TAF Other 
-           
2. P-TAF Self 
.48
**
 -          
3. P-TAF Financial 
Gain 
.72
**
 .40
**
 -         
4. P-TAF Moral 
.51
**
 .38
**
 .49
**
 -        
5. P-TAF Ethical/ 
Global  
.66
**
 .42
**
 .69
**
 .56
**
 -       
6. P-TAF Total 
.90
**
 .73
**
 .81
**
 .68
**
 .79
**
 -      
7. Gambling 
.18
**
 .18
**
 .28
**
 .15
*
 .23
**
 .25
**
 -     
8. Academic 
-.03 .02 .05 -.01 .08 .01 .23
**
 -    
9. Alcohol-Drugs 
-.01 .09 .04 -.01 .09 .04 .39
**
 .36
**
 -   
10. Sexual Risk 
.16* .16* .26
**
 .20
**
 .24
**
 .24
**
 .36
**
 .20
**
 .50
**
 -  
11. Total Risk 
 .10 .15
*
 .20
**
 .10 .21
**
 .18
**
 .75
**
 .61
**
 .82
**
 .63
**
 
- 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
   *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
Note:  
Gambling = Participants’ past and expected future gambling behaviour 
Academic = Participants’ past and expected future academic risk-taking behaviour 
Alcohol-Drugs = Participants’ past and expected future drug and alcohol use 
Sexual Risk = Participants’ past and expected future sexual risk-taking behaviour 
Total Risk = Total participants’ past and expected future risk-taking behaviour 
 
 
 
 
 44 
 
Positive TAF and risk perception. Bivariate scatterplots suggested linear 
relationships between the P -TAF scale and all forms (academic, sexual, and drinking / 
drugs) of negative and positive risk perception. One case was removed after being 
identified as an influential outlier. Please refer back to Table 2 for descriptive statistics. 
Normality plots and skew and kurtosis values indicated that the distributions approached 
normality for all variables except those involving the positive and negative perceptions of 
sexual risk. These variables were transformed, which corrected the normality violation 
for positive perceptions of sexual risk (skew = 1.15, kurtosis = 0.14), but not for the 
negative perceptions of sexual risk (skew = 3.39, kurtosis = 12.54). Therefore, 
Spearman’s rho was used for analyses involving the negative perception of sexual risk, as 
it converts the variables to ranked data and is robust to violations of normality.  
No statistically significant relationships were found between positive TAF and 
perceptions of academic consequences, negative sexual consequences, or alcohol / drug 
consequences. Therefore, this study did not support Hypothesis 7, which had proposed 
that positive TAF would be inversely related to the participants’ perception of possible 
negative risk.  Similarly, no statistically significant relationships were found between 
positive TAF and academic benefits, sexual benefits, or alcohol / drug benefits. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 8 was also not supported, as it had proposed that positive TAF 
would be positively related to the participants’ perception of possible positive 
consequences. Please see Table 4 for all correlational results between positive TAF and 
perceptions of risk. 
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Table 4 Correlations between P-TAF and Perceived Risk 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. P-TAF Total Scale 
 
-       
2. Perceived Academic Consequences -.11 -      
3. Perceived Sexual Consequences -.04 .51** -     
4. Perceived Alcohol / Drug Consequences -.03 .63
** .71** -    
5. Perceived Academic Benefits .11 -.30** -.15*  -.10 -   
6. Perceived Sexual Benefits .06 -.11 -.52** -.29** .45** -  
7. Perceived Alcohol / Drug Benefits .02 -.13* -.38** -.44** .40** .75** - 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2 tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2 tailed) 
Bolded values are Spearman’s rho correlational values 
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Positive TAF and impaired control over mental activities. The assumption of 
linear relationships was supported by bivariate scatterplots of the Padua Inventory Factor 
1 Scale with the Positive TAF scale and all P-TAF subscales. Three cases were removed 
after being identified as influential outliers. The assumption of normal distributions was 
supported by both normality plots and skew and kurtosis values for all variables. Please 
refer back to Table 2 for descriptive statistics.  
Correlations between the Padua Inventory Factor 1 and Positive TAF are shown 
in Table 5. There were statistically significant relationships between the Padua Inventory 
Factor 1 subscale and the Positive TAF scale, as well as between the Padua Inventory 
Factor 1 subscale and each of the P-TAF subscales. Hypothesis 6 had proposed a 
relationship between the Padua subscale and the P-TAF Harm Avoidance subscales, but 
the exploratory factor analysis conducted earlier in the study did not support the existence 
of P-TAF Harm Avoidance subscales. Even though these results could not support 
Hypothesis 6 directly, they did indicate that a statistically significant relationship exists 
between the impaired control of mental activities and positive TAF.  
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Table 5 Correlations between P-TAF and Impaired Control over Mental Activities 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
1. Padua Factor 1 -       
2. P-TAF Total Scale 
.24** -      
3. P-TAF Other subscale 
.21** .90** -     
4. P-TAF Self subscale 
.19** .72** .48** -    
5. P-TAF Financial Gain subscale 
.17** .81** .72** .40** -   
6. P-TAF Moral subscale 
.18** .67** .51** .37** .49** - . 
7. P-TAF Ethical/Global Concern 
.22** .80** .66** .42** .69** .56** - 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2 tailed) 
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Hierarchical Regression Analysis 
All forms of risk-taking behaviour from this study (gambling behaviour, academic 
risk-taking, alcohol / drug use, and sexual risk-taking behaviour) were combined to 
provide a total risk-taking score for use in the hierarchical regression analysis. A 
composite outcome measure was used because running separate regression analyses for 
each outcome measure did not yield parsimonious solutions that explained sufficient 
variance. The predictor variables (belief in good luck, magical thinking, and spirituality) 
were chosen for the hierarchical regression analyses based on the strength of their 
relationships to positive TAF in Study 1. However, correlational analyses in Study 2 
revealed that magical thinking (as measured by the illusory beliefs inventory) was not 
significantly related to the outcome variable, risk-taking behaviour. Therefore, it was 
removed from the analysis. Please see Table 6 for the correlational relationships between 
the variables.  
Plotting of the standardized predicted Y on the standardized residuals indicated 
that the assumption of linearity was not violated. A slight fanning pattern on the plot 
indicated a minimal amount of heteroscedasticity, and the distribution also indicated a 
violation of normality. Bootstrapping (1000 samples) was used to correct the violation of 
normality, which once corrected, rendered the test robust to heteroscedasticity. The 
Durbin-Watson value (Durbin-Watson = 1.851) was within the required range, indicating 
independence of errors.  Both tolerance and VIF indicated the absence of 
multicollinearity and singularity (tolerance > .1; VIF < 10). Six outliers on X were 
identified (standardized residuals > 2.5), and five outliers on Y (Mahalanobis distance > 
13.277) were also identified. Three of these cases were found to be influential 
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observations (COOKS >1; DFFIT >2). The decision was made to remove all outliers / 
influential observations prior to analysis. The final sample size (N = 255) was larger than 
the required (N = 60) sample size for this analysis. 
 The Spirituality / Religiosity Scale score (M = 17.55, SD = 5.44), and Belief in 
Good Luck Scale score (M = 42.61, SD = 10.26) were entered in the first block. The 
Positive TAF Scale score (M = 67.80, SD = 25.18) was entered as the second block. 
 The first step in the model was significant for spirituality and religiosity, and 
belief in good luck, R
2
 = .10, F(2, 251) = 14.12, p < .001. There was also a statistically 
significant change when positive TAF was entered into the model, R
2
 = .13, ΔR2 = .03, 
ΔF(1, 250) = 7.15, p = .008. Please see Table 7 for further details from the analysis. 
These results support Hypothesis 9, in that positive TAF did contribute to risk-taking 
behaviour above the participants’ belief in good luck and their spirituality. 
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Table 6 Correlations between all Variables Considered for use in Hierarchical Analyses  
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
1. Total Positive TAF  
 
- 
 
   
 
2. Total IBI Scale  .49** -    
3. Spirituality and Religiosity Scale .27** .57** -   
4. Belief in Good Luck Scale .41** .54**  .15*  -  
5. Total Risk  .13*  -.11 -.27** .13* - 
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2 tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2 tailed) 
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Table 7 Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Cognitive Predictors of Total 
Risk Behaviour  
 
N = 254 
 B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
      
Step 1      
      Spirituality/Religiosity -.24 .45 -.33 .10 .10 
      Belief in Good Luck 
.42 .25 .11 
  
Step 2      
      Positive TAF .28 .11 .18 .13 .03 
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Study 2 Discussion 
 To expand on the psychometric analyses from Study 1, the subscale structure of 
the Positive TAF Scale was examined using an exploratory factor analysis. The 
hypothesized subscale structure was not fully supported by the analysis, even though it 
maintained the existence of five subscales. The internal consistency values for the new 
subscales (1-Self; 2-Others; 3-Financial Gain; 4-Moral; 5-Ethical / Global) ranged from 
good (.7 ≤ α < .9) to excellent (.9 ≤ α), supporting the new subscale structure.  
Following the factor analysis, the Moral subscale retained the same items from 
the hypothesized Moral subscale, and remained unchanged. However, the Self and Others 
subscales did not retain their separate personal-gain and harm-avoidance features that had 
been present in the hypothesized structure, with Others Gain, Others Harm-Avoidance, 
Self – Gain, and Self Harm-Avoidance each classifying a separate subscale. Instead, the 
new Self and Others subscales contain a number of items that collectively represent both 
gain and avoidance. The items that did not factor into the new Self and Others subscales 
formed two subscales that had not been present in the hypothesized subscale structure. 
These new subscales were the Financial Gain subscale, and the Ethical / Global Concern 
subscale. The Financial Gain subscale contains items that describe situations that would 
financially benefit a person, such as winning the lottery or becoming a millionaire. The 
Ethical / Global Concern subscale contains items such as “If I think of myself getting 
away with cheating, this increases the chance that I will get away with cheating,” and 
“When I hear news reports of peace talks, I know that it is because I thought about world 
peace.” 
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Further psychometric evaluation investigated the relationship between impaired 
control of mental activities and the harm-avoidance subscales (self and other). There was 
some difficulty in testing this hypothesis (Hypothesis 6), since harm-avoidance subscales 
were not supported by the exploratory factor analysis. Even though the hypothesis could 
not be tested as stated, statistically significant relationships were found between impaired 
control of mental activities and the total P-TAF Scale, as well as with all five of the new 
subscales. In describing his cognitive theory of obsessions, Rachman (1977) defines 
obsessions as being the result of catastrophic misinterpretations of the significance of 
personal thoughts. The Padua Inventory Factor 1 Subscale was designed expressly to 
measure the impaired control of mental activities that is associated with obsessive-
compulsive disorder (Sanavio, 1988b). It follows that the relationship of positive TAF to 
the Padua Factor 1 subscale highlights the cognitive distortions involved in positive TAF, 
which indicates that positive TAF may have a possible relationship with obsessive-
compulsive tendencies, or even with obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
The gender and age of the participants was analyzed to help guide future research. 
The gender of the participants was not related to their level of positive thought-action 
fusion, but it was found to be related to their risk-taking behaviour, with males reporting 
more risk-taking behaviour than females. This relationship between gender and risk-
taking is consistent with the research reported by Byrnes, Miller, and Schafer (1999). 
These authors conducted a meta-analysis of 150 studies, and concluded that males were 
much more likely to engage in risk-taking behaviours; particularly, risky behaviours that 
were intellectual or physical in nature.  
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Similarly, the age of the participants was not related to their level of positive 
thought-action fusion, but it was found to be related to their risk-taking behaviour, with 
older adolescents reporting more risk-taking behaviour than young adults. This 
relationship between age and risky behaviour is consistent with past research (Todesco, 
2005), which found that risk-taking behaviours in this age range are highest in 
adolescence and decrease into young adulthood. 
If age and gender were involved in mediating the relationship between positive 
TAF and risk, a relationship would be expected between positive TAF and these 
variables. The findings from Study 2 suggest that age and gender are not involved in 
mediation, but rather that they influence risk-taking behaviour independently of the 
positive TAF construct.  
Correlational analyses were used to test Hypotheses 1 through 4, which looked at 
the association between positive TAF and the various forms of risk that were examined in 
this study. The results only supported two of these hypotheses (H2 and H3), in that 
positive TAF was significantly related to gambling behaviour and risky sexual behaviour, 
but not to academic risk-taking or alcohol / drug use. The relationship between gambling 
and positive TAF is consistent with the past research by Barrault and Varescon (2012), 
who found that people with irrational beliefs had a propensity to overestimate their 
control over the outcome of gambling events, and that pathological gamblers had a higher 
prevalence of cognitive distortions. However, the overall results from this study, which 
indicate a relationship between positive TAF with some forms of risk-taking but not 
others, were unexpected. Since gambling is, by definition, risk-taking, a positive 
association between positive TAF and gambling behaviour would suggest an association 
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between positive TAF and other forms of risk-taking behaviour. It is possible that 
mediating factors are involved for these other forms of risk-taking that were not 
addressed in the current study. For example, the participants’ personalities and affect are 
possible mediating factors that may influence the relationship between positive TAF and 
risky behaviour. As detailed earlier, there is a great deal of variability in the extent to 
which these forms of behaviour (gambling, alcohol / drug use, sexual activity, and 
academic behaviours) can be participated in, while still avoiding the associated risk. The 
participants’ personalities and affect may influence the relationship between positive 
TAF and the degree to which they are motivated to engage in these activities. 
Hypothesis 5 examined the relationship between risky behaviours and the Positive 
Gain subscales (self and other).  This hypothesis could not be tested, since the 
exploratory factor analysis did not support the existence of positive gain or harm 
avoidance subscales. However, the analyses did indicate that gambling behaviour shared 
the highest relationships with the Financial Gain subscale and the total P-TAF scale, 
followed closely by the Ethical / Global Concern subscale. The relationship between 
gambling and the Financial Gain subscale is expected, since this subscale includes items 
such as, “If I think of myself winning while scratching lottery tickets, it will increase the 
chance of winning,” and “If I think of myself winning the lottery, this increases my 
chance of winning the lottery.”  The relationship between gambling and the Total P-TAF 
Scale was also expected, since the scale indicates a general belief that personal thoughts 
can influence positive outcomes. However, a strong relationship between gambling and 
the Ethical / Global Concern subscale was not expected. This scale includes items such 
as, “When I hear news of peace talks, I know that it is because I thought about world 
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peace.” It is possible that the relationship between gambling and ethical / global concern 
comes from the positive TAF bias being generalized to a variety of thought processes. 
Further investigation will be needed to delineate this relationship.      
Risky sexual behaviour shared the strongest relationships with the total P-TAF 
scale and the Ethical / Global concern subscale, followed by the Financial Gain subscale 
and Self subscale. Similar to the findings with gambling behaviour, the strong 
relationship between risky sexual behaviour and the Total Positive TAF scale could be 
expected, due to the associated cognitive bias in which people believe that their thoughts 
can positively influence outcomes. A strong relationship between risky sexual behaviour 
and the Self subscale could also be expected, as this scale includes items such as, “If I 
think about being attractive, it will make my desired partner more attracted to me.” The 
strong relationships involving risky sexual behaviour with the Ethical / Global Concern 
subscale and the Financial Gain subscale were not expected. As with the relationship 
between gambling and ethical / global concern, it is possible that the positive TAF bias 
has generalized to various thought processes, influencing the relationships between risky 
sexual behaviour and ethical / global concern and financial gain.  
Correlational analyses were also used to test the relationship between positive 
TAF and risk perception (H7 and H8). Perceptions of the risks and benefits associated 
with gambling were not investigated in the current study, but there were no statistically 
significant relationships found between positive TAF and the participants’ perceptions of 
the risks or benefits associated with academic risk, sexual risk, or alcohol and drug use. It 
is possible that people who experience the positive TAF bias perceive the same amount 
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of inherent risk in activities as people without cognitive bias; yet, they feel that the risks 
will not affect them, because their thoughts will overrule the inherent risks. 
Hierarchical regression analyses were used to investigate (H9) whether positive 
TAF contributed to risk-taking behaviour above some of the constructs that were shown 
to be closely related to Positive TAF in Study 1 (belief in good luck and spirituality). All 
forms of risk behaviour (gambling, sexual risk-taking, academic risk-taking, and alcohol / 
drug use) from this study were summed to produce one total risk value to be used as the 
outcome variable for these analyses. Approximately 3% of the risk-taking behaviour from 
this sample could be attributed to positive TAF after belief in good luck and spirituality 
were accounted for. Although 3% is not a large percentage, it shows that positive TAF 
does account for some of the risk-taking behaviour in a university sample. Past work by 
Barrault and Varescon (2012) indicated that cognitive distortions are more common 
among pathological gamblers. Future investigations into positive TAF could assess 
clinical populations, such as pathological gamblers, to examine if the positive TAF 
contributes equally to risk-taking behaviours in clinical populations. 
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Chapter Three 
General Discussion  
Positive thought-action fusion was investigated in this project as a distinct 
cognitive bias. Past investigations with the thought-action fusion construct had 
maintained a focus on the belief that negative outcomes could occur as a result of 
personal thoughts. Alternatively, the positive TAF construct focuses on the belief that 
positive outcomes can occur as a result of personal thoughts. These two cognitive biases 
are related, but conceptually distinct. Where the thought-action fusion bias is implicated 
in the individual’s obsessive desire to avoid the negative outcomes believed to result 
from their thoughts, the positive TAF bias is hypothesized to increase personal desire to 
obtain the positive  outcomes that they believe result from their thoughts.  
The P-TAF Scale was designed to fundamentally emulate Shafran, Thordarson, 
and Rachman’s TAF-R Scale (1996b), in order to maintain the focus on measuring 
cognitive bias. The relationship between the P-TAF and the TAF-R helps to provide 
evidence for construct validity of the P-TAF Scale. However, evidence was also gained 
to show that the cognitive bias that is measured by the P-TAF is distinct from the 
cognitive bias measured by the TAF-R, due to the P-TAF focus on positive outcomes.   
The P-TAF gained support for convergent validity in Study 1 through its 
relationships with several conceptually similar phenomena. Yet, none of these 
relationships were strong enough to suggest that positive TAF was not a distinct 
construct. The P-TAF scale was refined in Study 2 after a factor analysis revealed a five-
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factor subscale structure that included a Self subscale, Other subscale, Financial Gain 
subscale, Moral subscale, and Ethical / Global Concern subscale.  
In Study 2, the P-TAF was employed to measure positive TAF’s relationship to 
perceptions of risk, risky behaviours, and impaired control of mental activities. While 
there were no statistically significant findings to support a relationship between positive 
TAF and perceptions of risk, there was evidence gained in support of the hypothesized 
relationship between positive TAF and some forms of risky behaviours, and there was 
support for a relationship between positive TAF and impaired mental control.  
Young people’s engagement in risk-taking behaviours can alter their life 
trajectory. In some cases, these life-changing risks could be beneficial, such as in the case 
of a person quitting a steady job to pursue an interest that turns out to be far more 
enjoyable and profitable than the original job. However, in other circumstances, the 
person’s life trajectory could change for the worse, such as when participation in 
gambling becomes an addiction. The identification of positive TAF and its relationship to 
some forms of risk-taking behaviour could lead to enhanced understanding of these 
behaviours, which could lead to improved intervention strategies. 
Limitations 
The current project involved two studies, which were designed to act as merely 
the starting point for investigations into the positive thought-action fusion phenomenon. 
Since the current project represents the first stage of research for this cognitive bias, 
investigation was limited to psychometric exploration of the scale, and the exploration of 
a limited number of risky behaviours. Therefore, the sample represented only two age 
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groups, which were drawn completely from post-secondary institutions in one geographic 
area, which may not provide a sample that represents the general population (Sears, 
1986). Furthermore, the participation rate of males was disproportionately low. This may 
have increased the possibility of Type II errors in Study 2, since both current and past 
research (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999) have identified gender differences in risk-
taking behaviour. Another limitation that was specific to Study 2 is that it did not explore 
the participants’ perceptions of the risks and benefits associated with gambling 
behaviour, since gambling was not included in the forms of risky behaviour assessed by 
the CARE Scale. Despite these limitations, this research was successful in demonstrating 
that positive thought-action fusion is a distinct cognitive bias, and that we have a valid 
scale with which to measure it. It has also provided evidence that this cognitive bias 
contributes to some forms of risk-taking behaviours and impaired mental control.  
Applications and Future Directions 
At the onset of this project, it was theorized that positive TAF would be 
implicated in social phenomena, rather than in the clinical disorders that have been 
associated with Rachman’s thought-action fusion bias (1993). However, the results from 
these studies, particularly, the relationship between positive TAF and the impaired 
control of mental activities, suggest that positive TAF may also be implicated in some 
clinical disorders, such as obsessive-compulsive disorder and anxiety.  
The relationship between positive thought-action fusion and impaired control of 
mental activities (as measured by Factor 1 of the Padua Inventory) suggests that positive 
TAF may also be related to obsessive-compulsive tendencies, since the Padua Inventory 
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was developed specifically for the assessment of OCD (Sanavio, 1988b). Further 
indication of a possible relationship between positive TAF and OCD is suggested by the 
fact that the relationship between OCD and the original TAF construct has been well 
documented (e.g., Berle & Starcevic, 2005), and positive TAF was found to be correlated 
with the original thought-action fusion bias in Study 1.  
MacLeod and Mathews (2012) discuss how various cognitive models of anxiety 
generally share the premise that cognitive biases play a central causal role in people’s 
vulnerability to experience unduly intense anxiety symptoms. The current project 
revealed that positive TAF is related to the original thought-action fusion construct, as 
well as impaired control of mental abilities, both of which have been associated with 
some people’s tendency to assume exaggerated responsibility for their personal thoughts 
(Rachman, 1993). This tendency toward exaggerated responsibility has been associated 
with anxiety in past literature (see Berle & Starcevic, 2005). Taken together, these 
relationships suggest that there may be a possible link between positive TAF and anxiety. 
Future research could include samples drawn from clinical populations to investigate the 
true relationship between positive TAF and anxiety, OCD, gambling addictions, and 
other disorders. 
Cognitive bias modification (CBM) is often used as an intervention strategy to 
help people who display symptoms associated with cognitive biases. Unlike cognitive-
behaviour therapy (CBT), which seeks to alter the way that individuals respond to 
anxiety-provoking thoughts, Cognitive bias modification (CBM) seeks to change 
individual cognitive patterns to stop the anxiety-provoking thoughts from occurring. 
MacLeod and Mathews (2012) state that most research regarding CBM has focused on 
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attentional bias and interpretative bias, but that the principles underlying the CBM 
approach could be extended to other types of cognitive biases, as well. Since 
interventions have already been developed for other cognitive biases, future research 
could investigate whether these same interventions could be extended to help people who 
are distressed by positive TAF. 
Other directions for future research include expanding on current findings, such as 
exploring the relationship between positive TAF and risk-taking behaviour further by 
investigating possible mediating factors, such as personality and affect. Another possible 
mediating factor is motivational state. Differences in people’s motivation to participate in 
certain activities may influence the relationship between the positive TAF bias and actual 
participation in risky behaviours. For example, although participation in some forms of 
risky behaviour may provide an immediate benefit, such as financial gain from gambling, 
some people may not be motivated to participate in gambling because they are more 
focused on long-term goals. Information about possible mediating factors will help to 
delineate the differences found in the associations between positive TAF and the various 
forms of risk-taking behaviour. 
Another avenue for future research is the investigation of positive TAF in relation 
to various forms of positive risk-taking behaviour, such as the personal risk involved in 
many heroic acts, or the financial risk involved in developing innovations. Research on 
resilience factors may also benefit from future investigations of the positive TAF 
construct; particularly, if a relationship is found between positive TAF and positive risk-
taking behaviour. Any increase in the propensity for people to take positive risks, may 
increase their resilience through a decreased feeling of helplessness. Additionally, 
 63 
 
spirituality and religion have been associated with resilience in past studies (e.g., 
Resnick, Harris & Blum, 1993), and this association may be influenced by the 
relationship between positive TAF and spirituality.  
The field of Military Psychology may also benefit from further research on the 
relationship between positive TAF and positive risk-taking behaviour, as well as its 
possible association with resilience. Military work requires a significant amount of 
personal risk-taking, and the relationship between positive TAF and positive risk-taking 
behaviour may contribute to the knowledge base of factors involved in taking these 
personal risks. In addition, Wooten (2012) found that the relationship between stressors 
and post-traumatic stress symptoms was fully mediated by resilience factors.  
Future research could also pursue further analyses of the relationship between 
positive thought-action fusion and risk perception. Although Study 2 did not produce any 
significant findings concerning the quantity of risk perceptions by the participants, it is 
possible that risks are perceived qualitatively different by people who experience the 
positive TAF cognitive distortion. Study 2 only investigated whether people with positive 
TAF perceived more or less risk than others. However, it is possible that people with the 
positive TAF bias perceive risk differently. A qualitative study may be able to identify 
specific differences in the way that people perceive the risks associated with various 
activities. The identification of key components from the positive TAF bias, such as 
qualitative differences in risk perception, can be used to refine the development of risk 
interventions. It is only through further investigation of factors that contribute to risky 
decision-making that we can hope to prevent the negative outcomes that can result from 
some forms of risk-taking behaviour. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix A Positive Thought-Action Fusion Scale (Craig, J. C., 2013) 
 
 
Please indicate the extent that you agree with the following statements  
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
If I think of a sick relative / 
friend getting better, this 
increases the chance that 
they will get well.  
       
 
If I think of myself 
winning a competition, it 
increases the chance that I 
will win.  
       
 
If I think of myself 
winning the lottery, this 
increases my chance of 
winning the lottery.  
       
 
If I think of my car 
running well, it decreases 
the chance that my car will 
break down.  
       
 
If I think of myself getting 
away with cheating, this 
increases the chance that I 
will get away with cheating  
       
 
If I think of a relative/friend 
finding a new job, this 
increases the chance that 
they will get a new job.  
       
 
If I think about my pet 
staying healthy, it 
increases the chance that 
they will stay healthy.  
       
 
Thinking of someone else 
being successful increases 
the chance that they will be 
successful. 
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Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
If I think about winning, it 
decreases the chance of me 
losing  
 
       
If I think of a friend/relative 
winning the lottery, this 
increases the chance that 
they will win the lottery.  
 
       
If I think of myself in a 
higher position at work, it 
increases the chance that I 
will get a promotion. 
 
       
If I think of myself as 
being popular, it will make 
me have more friends. 
  
       
Thinking about helping 
someone else is almost the 
same as actually helping 
someone. 
 
       
If I think of my friend / 
relative winning an award, it 
increases the chance that 
they will win an award.  
 
       
When I have a kind 
thought about someone 
else, it is almost as good as 
paying them a compliment. 
  
       
If I think about the end of 
global warming, it will 
increase the chance that 
global warming will end.  
 
       
When I am sick, if I think 
about getting better, it 
increases the chance that I 
will get better.  
 
       
If I think of being a 
millionaire, there is a 
better chance that I will get 
a million dollars  
 
       
If I think of a friend/ 
relative avoiding a car 
accident, this decreases the 
chance that they will have 
a car accident  
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Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongl
y Agree 
If I think about animals 
being friendly, it decreases 
the chance that I will be 
attacked by an animal  
       
If I think of myself 
winning while scratching 
lottery tickets, it will 
increase the chance of 
winning  
       
 
When I hear news reports 
of peace talks, I know that 
it is because I thought 
about world peace.  
       
If I think of a 
friend/relative getting 
home safely, this increases 
the likelihood that they 
will get home safely.  
       
 
If I think about being 
attractive, it will make my 
desired partner more 
attracted to me  
       
 
Having an honourable 
thought is almost as good 
as doing an honourable 
deed.  
       
 
If I think that I won’t get 
caught speeding, it 
increases the chance that I 
will get away with 
speeding.  
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Appendix B   Descriptive Information of Study 1Measures 
 
Scale 
(N = 198) 
Range 
min. 
Range 
max. 
Mean SD Skew Kurtosis 
APNI positive subscale 16 56 43.52 7.821 -1.022 1.431 
APNI negative subscale 14 55 39.96 7.822 -.622 .456 
APNI total scale (pos minus neg) -35 40 3.55 11.275 -.252 2.322 
Belief in Good Luck Scale 20 76 46.86 10.748 -.420 .038 
Hope Pathways subscale 6 16 12.20 1.788 -.362 .943 
Hope Agency subscale 5 16 12.15 2.119 -.427 .899 
Hope Scale Total 14 32 24.35 3.471 -.220 .686 
IBI magical beliefs subscale 10 48 24.00 6.609 .088 .215 
IBI spirituality subscale 9 44 28.33 6.883 -.242 -.141 
IBI Internal State and TAF subscale 5 25 14.28 4.170 -.223 -.207 
IBI Total scale 31 100 66.61 14.316 -.460 -.055 
Magical Ideation Scale Total 0 24 8.14 5.369 .788 .240 
Positivity Scale Total 16 36 28.82 3.801 -1.020 1.501 
Positive TAF moral subscale 3 21 9.71 3.924 .304 -.452 
Positive TAF Likelihood Others Positive Gain subscale 5 35 13.15 6.896 .681 -.359 
Positive TAF Likelihood Others Harm Avoidance subscale 5 35 11.68 5.936 .904 .730 
Positive TAF Likelihood Self Positive Gain subscale 8 56 27.35 9.691 .001 -.272 
Positive TAF Likelihood Self Harm Avoidance subscale 5 35 13.42 5.878 .661 .439 
Positive Thought-Action Fusion Total 26 182 75.32 28.588 .479 .271 
Spirituality and Religiosity Scale 8 36 19.01 6.558 .394 -.432 
TAF moral subscale 12 60 33.74 11.117 .008 -.337 
TAF Likelihood Others subscale 3 20 7.72 3.331 .809 .564 
TAF Likelihood Self subscale 3 15 6.81 2.823 .336 -.596 
Thought-Action Fusion Total 19 95 48.28 14.707 -.072 .058 
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Appendix C  Correlations of Positive Thought-Action Fusion with Conceptually 
Similar Constructs 
 
  Positive 
TAF Scale 
Moral 
Subscale 
Other  
Gain 
Subscale 
Other  
Harm -
Avoidance 
Subscale 
Self  Gain 
Subscale 
Self  
Harm–
Avoidance 
Subscale 
Hope 
r .119 .031 .033 .081 .197** .114 
p .094 .666 .642 .255 .005 .111 
Hope Agency 
r .068 .025 -.018 .050 .147* .039 
p .343 .724 .803 .483 .038 .581 
Hope Pathways 
r .152* .030 .086 .098 .209** .174* 
p .033 .674 .230 .168 .003 .014 
BIGL 
r .419** .321** .392** .401** .350** .382** 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Religiosity 
r .360** .300** .295** .320** .349** .307** 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
Positivity 
r .025 .015 -.003 .030 .025 .044 
p .725 .831 .970 .676 .727 .538 
MIS 
r .505** .348** .462** .462** .436** .498** 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
TAF – R Total 
r .574** .432** .492** .543** .527** .509** 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
TAF – R Moral 
r .430** .343** .353** .397** .411** .370** 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
TAF – R Others 
r .567** .392** .560** .590** .437** .520** 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
TAF – R Self 
r .627** .434** .511** .566** .611** .581** 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
IBI Total 
r .529** .391** .474** .451** .491** .488** 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
IBI Internal 
State 
r .572** .406** .506** .489** .515** .576** 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
IBI Spirituality 
r .266** .223** .244** .189** .297** .175* 
p .000 .002 .001 .008 .000 .014 
IBI Magical 
r .507** .358** .452** .473** .430** .512** 
p .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000  
APNI Total 
r .032 -.045 .015 -.005 .086 .032 
p .653 .533 .833 .944 .231 .651 
APNI Positive 
r .116 .003 .093 .093 .156* .101 
p .104 .970 .191 .191 .028 .158 
APNI Negative 
r .070 .067 .071 .101 .033 .054 
p .330 .348 .317 .159 .646 .449 
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Appendix D  Bivariate Correlations of items from the Positive TAF Scale 
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Appendix E  Factor Loadings for Positive TAF Scale 
 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Communality 
Estimates 
P-TAF 4 
.672 .060 .266 .046 -.147 .710 
P-TAF 5 
.904 .122 -.096 -.087 -.047 .632 
P-TAF 7 
.577 .041 .236 .047 -.025 .653 
P-TAF 8 
.609 .129 .027 .073 -.057 .519 
P-TAF 9 
.817 -.227 -.024 .003 .109 .618 
P-TAF 11 
.927 -.062 .006 .045 -.177 .649 
P-TAF 13 
.578 .148 -.064 -.073 .210 .536 
P-TAF 23 
.420 -.044 .200 -.084 .335 .607 
P-TAF 26 
.339 .278 -.087 .053 .106 .380 
P-TAF 16 -.012 .814 .068 -.076 -.042 .553 
P-TAF 21 -.190 .699 .163 .045 -.057 .423 
P-TAF 15 .040 .689 -.026 .004 .063 .502 
P-TAF 18 .104 .688 -.111 .032 -.056 .486 
P-TAF 17 -.012 .570 -.180 .086 .234 .463 
P-TAF 25 .155 .523 .073 -.015 .015 .457 
P-TAF 20 .103 .059 .821 -.141 .013 .691 
P-TAF 6 .138 -.049 .794 .096 -.072 .744 
P-TAF 14 .105 -.061 .755 -.055 .093 .689 
P-TAF 19 -.129 .259 .331 .035 .282 .424 
P-TAF 1 .050 -.012 -.199 .842 .016 .478 
P-TAF 2 -.027 -.055 .159 .533 .154 .502 
P-TAF 3 -.018 .130 .081 .690 -.154 .423 
P-TAF 22 -.150 .132 -.023 -.078 .793 .449 
P-TAF 10 .165 -.070 .131 .215 .320 .498 
P-TAF 12 .050 -.014 .255 .121 .374 .491 
P-TAF 24 .155 -.108 .091 .013 .603 .527 
       
Total 
Communality 
Estimate 
     
14.104 
Variance (%) 
explained by 
each factor 40.014 10.330 5.694 4.666 3.371 
 
Hyperplane 
Count 7 11 12 20 12 (47.69 %) 
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Appendix F Subscale Structure of the Positive TAF Scale 
 
 
Factor 1: TAF Others  
4. If I think of a relative/friend finding a new job, this increases the chance that they will get a new 
job. 
5. If I think of a sick relative/friend getting better, this increases the chance that they will get well. 
7. If I think of my friend/relative winning an award, it increases the chance that they will win an 
award. 
8. Thinking of someone else being successful increases the chance that they will be successful. 
9. If I think of a friend/relative avoiding a car accident, this decreases the chance that they will have 
a car accident 
11. If I think of a friend/relative getting home safely, this increases the likelihood that they will get 
home safely. 
13. If I think about my pet staying healthy, it increases the chance that they will stay healthy. 
23. If I think of my car running well, it decreases the chance that my car will break down. 
26. If I think about animals being friendly, it decreases the chance that I will be attacked by an animal 
 
Factor 2: TAF Self  
16. If I think of myself winning a competition, it increases the chance that I will win. 
21. If I think about being attractive, it will make my desired partner more attracted to me 
15. If I think of myself in a higher position at work, it increases the chance that I will get a 
promotion. 
18. When I am sick, if I think about getting better, it increases the chance that I will get better. 
17. If I think of myself as being popular, it will make me have more friends. 
25. If I think about winning, it decreases the chance of me losing 
 
Factor 3: TAF Financial Gain 
20. If I think of myself winning while scratching lottery tickets, it will increase the chance of winning  
6. If I think of a friend/relative winning the lottery, this increases the chance that they will win the 
lottery. 
14. If I think of myself winning the lottery, this increases my chance of winning the lottery. 
19. If I think of being a millionaire, there is a better chance that I will get a million dollars 
 
Factor 4: TAF Moral 
1. Having an honourable thought is almost as good as doing an honourable deed. 
2. Thinking about helping someone else is almost the same as actually helping someone. 
3. When I have a kind thought about someone else, it is almost as good as paying them a 
compliment. 
 
Factor 5: TAF Ethical / Global Concern 
22. If I think of myself getting away with cheating, this increases the chance that I will get away with 
cheating 
10. When I hear news reports of peace talks, I know that it is because I thought about world peace. 
12. If I think about the end of global warming, it will increase the chance that global warming will 
end. 
24. If I think that I won’t get caught speeding, it increases the chance that I will get away with 
speeding. 
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